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We analyze the initial intellectual property (IP) right of 4,703 start-up entrants in the 
US, distinguishing between trademark and patent applications. The results show that 
start-ups are more likely to file for a trademark instead of a patent when entering into 
more competitive market structures. Further, we find that start-ups with a focus on 
distribution that serves end-consumers are more likely to file for a trademark and that 
start-ups that operate upstream and sell to other businesses are more likely to file for a 
patent. Lastly, the external influences on a start-up‟s management, such as the 
involvement of a venture capitalist (VC), affect IP applications. The increased incentive 
of VC-backed start-ups to become operational on the market makes them more likely to 
file initial IP in the form of a trademark rather than a patent. Among other factors, we 
control for R&D and advertising intensity in the industry and distinguish between more 
technical and more service-driven industries. 
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During the previous decade, research on intellectual property rights expanded from being 
mainly patent-oriented to establishing a significant role for trademarks: similar to patents, 
trademarks were found to be positively related to firm valuations (Greenhalgh & Rogers 
2006b; 2007; Sandner & Block, 2011) and firm survival (Helmers & Rogers, 2010; Wagner 
& Cockburn, 2010). For example, Apple‟s brand value, which is protected by trademarks, 
was estimated at a value of $182 billion in 2012
1
, while the value of its patents was estimated 
at a value of $90-$100 per device by John Hauser of MIT in the court case between Apple 
and Samsung. This type of complementarity between patents and trademarks is examined and 
confirmed in Amara, Landry, & Traoré (2008), Graham & Somaya (2004) and Kong & 
Seldon (2004). Further, in addition to patents, trademarks have been suggested to be 
indicators of innovative activities (Flikkema, De Man & Wolters, 2010; Malmberg, 2005; 
Mendonça, Pereira, & Godinho, 2004). Finally, in addition to patents, trademarks were found 
to function as an entry barrier for new start-up firms (Davies, 2009; Kong & Seldon, 2004; 
Ramello, 2006; Ramello & Silva, 2006).  
It is of interest to analyze patents and trademarks because they each reflect specific 
strategic intentions: while patents relate to the protection of technological assets (Greenhalgh 
& Rogers, 2010), trademarks relate to the commercialization of an invention and the 
protection of a firm‟s brand and marketing assets (Sandner & Block, 2011). Thus far, the 
common explanation of intellectual property (IP) strategy is that firms that are active in 
R&D-intensive and more technical industries will file for patent protection (Griliches, 1984; 
1998; Kortum, 1993), while firms that are active in advertising-intensive, consumer- and 
service-related industries are more likely to file for trademark protection (Malmberg, 2005; 
Mendonça et al., 2004). This explanation, however, only considers the type of activity in 
                                                 
1
 According to Millward Brown Optimor's 2012 BrandZ study. 
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which a firm engages, and no other determinants have been either theoretically or empirically 
explored. We address this research gap by examining the initial IP direction (trademark or 
patent) of 4,703 start-up entrants in the US that filed for initial IP rights between 1998 and 
2007.  
According to the start-up strategy literature, specifically Porter‟s (1980) differentiation 
typology, trademark applications are mostly used by start-ups that operate according to a 
marketing differentiation strategy, while patents are the primary protection mechanism for 
start-ups that operate under a technical or product differentiation strategy (see also Carter, 
Stearns, Reynolds & Miller, 1994; McGee, Dowling & Megginson, 1995). Although both 
patents and trademarks are important in the protection of a firm‟s intangible assets, we still 
have little knowledge about the determinants of a firm‟s IP strategy. Sutton‟s (2007) work on 
endogenous sunk costs provides a theoretical base for advertising and R&D as strategies to 
increase consumers‟ willingness to pay for a product. Appropriating the benefits from these 
strategies requires filing for trademark and patent protection, respectively. In addition to these 
endogenous sunk costs, Sutton (2007) states that economies of scale impose an exogenous 
sunk cost on firms that intend to enter an industry. The way in which exogenous and 
endogenous sunk costs interact with each other determines firm concentration in an industry. 
As economies of scale in the production of a good or service can arise for various reasons, it 
is generally difficult to measure. Given that endogenous sunk costs (in the form of R&D and 
advertising costs) and exogenous sunk costs (in terms of entry barriers) jointly determine 
industry concentration, we include industry concentration in our analysis to control for 
endogenous sunk costs at the industry level (and beyond the control of an individual firm). In 




Because trademarks are an important tool in establishing the communicative link to 
consumers (Economides, 1988; Sandner & Block, 2011), trademarks should be more relevant 
in markets with differentiated goods where exogenous sunk costs are low, supporting a start-
up‟s visibility among the variety of available products. In contrast, patents may be a more 
critical tool especially in “winner-take-all,” i.e. less competitive, markets, where dominant 
technologies are industry standards. In these markets, start-ups that enter a market with novel, 
patented technological knowledge pose a greater threat to the established incumbents 
(Abernathy & Clark, 1984; Christensen & Bower, 1996; Henderson, 1993; Hill & 
Rothaermel, 2003).  
The firm perspective that we take in this paper also allows us to consider firm-level 
explanations in addition to industry-level explanations. We argue that IP strategy is partly 
related to a start-up‟s customer type. Start-ups that operate upstream in the supply chain and 
sell to other businesses are more likely to operate under a technical or product differentiation 
strategy because they provide relevant inputs for the product development process (McGee et 
al., 1995). Such company assets are protected by patents. In comparison, downstream start-
ups that serve end-consumers are more focused on marketing and distribution, and are thus 
more likely to operate under a marketing differentiation strategy (Carter et al., 1994; Tan, 
2001). Brand and marketing assets are typically protected by trademarks.  
Thirdly, we argue that the influences on a start-up‟s management, such as the 
involvement of a venture capital (VC) investor, may influence IP orientation. VCs hold 
significant decision power and spend most of their time advising and monitoring the start-ups 
in which they invest (Gompers & Lerner, 2004; Sahlman, 1990). When engaging with a start-
up, VCs are likely to prioritize the commercialization of a start-up‟s invention by setting 
milestones that are related primarily to market orientation and the generation of initial 
revenues (Berkery, 2008; Hellman & Puri, 2000; 2002; Hills, 1984; Hisrisch, 1989). Such a 
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focus on commercialization may push a start-up toward a more trademark-oriented IP 
strategy.  
Analyzing a sample of 4,703 start-ups in the US, we show that as market competition 
intensifies, start-ups will be more likely to file initial IP in the form of a trademark and less 
likely in the form of a patent. Secondly, start-ups that serve end-consumers are more likely to 
file for trademark protection, as compared to start-ups that serve other businesses, which are 
more likely to file for patent protection. Thirdly, we find that the involvement of a VC 
investor leads to a higher likelihood of filing initial IP in the form of trademark as compared 
to a patent. In our analysis, we control for the R&D and advertising intensity within a start-
up‟s market niche and sector fixed effects.  
We provide significant contributions to several literature streams. Firstly, our findings 
contribute to the start-up strategy literature (Carter et al., 1994; McGee et al., 1995), as we 
are, to the best of our knowledge, the first study to examine the determinants behind start-up 
IP direction reflecting strategic intentions. These findings connect to previous works, as 
patents can be associated with more technical or product differentiation strategies and 
trademarks, which protect brand and marketing assets, can be associated with marketing 
differentiation strategies (see also Carter et al., 1994; Chaganti et al., 1989; Li, 2007; McGee 
et al., 1995; Miles and Snow, 1978; Miller, 1986; 1991; Porter, 1980; Schrader and Siegel, 
2007). Secondly, as mentioned above, by providing empirical evidence on the influences of 
firm- and industry-level characteristics on trademark and patent filings, we contribute to the 
growing body of literature that addresses the relevance of trademarks in comparison with the 
role of patents in the protection of innovative assets (e.g., Amara et al., 2008; Davies, 2009; 
Ramello, 2006; Sandner and Block, 2011). Thirdly, we contribute to the IP-market structure 
literature. A main discussion point in this literature lies in the relationship between market 
structure and the incentive to innovate and file for IP protection. Schumpeter (1950) and 
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Arrow (1962)‟s hypotheses in this respect have been tested and discussed in many follow-up 
works (e.g., Arora, 1997; Acs & Audretsch, 1987; Greenhalgh & Rogers, 2006a; Levin, 
Cohen, & Mowery, 1985; Loury, 1979; Malerba & Orsenigo, 2002; Scherer, 1984). 
However, little is known thus far about how market structure may affect the type of IP 
protection that is filed. Depending on the intensity of competition, start-ups may behave 
differently, filing the type of IP that is most suitable given exogenous sunk costs and the 
build toward a competitive advantage. Overall, this literature stream has solely addressed the 
role of patents. Fourthly, we contribute to the VC-IP literature. In the VC-IP literature, it is 
shown that start-ups that file for IP rights have a higher likelihood of receiving VC funds in 
the first place (Cao & Hsu, 2011; Engel & Keilbach, 2007; Haeussler, Harhoff, & Muller, 
2009) and that IP rights have a positive relationship with subsequent start-up valuations by 
VCs (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Block, De Vries, Sandner, & Schumann, 2012; Hsu & 
Ziedonis, 2007; Lerner, 1994). However, the influence of a VC investor on a start-up‟s type 
of IP application has thus far not been explored. VCs have powerful decision rights and spend 
most of their time as advisors to start-up companies (Gompers & Lerner, 2004). VCs are 
therefore likely to influence the strategy of a start-up, which is partly reflected in its IP 
decisions.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant 
background information on trademarks and patents. Section 3 develops our hypotheses with 
regard to the effects of market competition, customer type, and the involvement of VC 
investors on a start-up‟s IP preferences. Section 4 describes our data. Section 5 presents 
descriptive and multivariate results, which are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 discusses the 
limitations and avenues for future research. Section 8 presents the conclusions of our study.  
 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON TRADEMARKS AND PATENTS 
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Because many previous works have addressed the role of patents for start-ups, we will 
elaborate somewhat more on the topic of trademarks in this section. Relevant comparisons to 
patents are made.  
A trademark is “a distinctive sign, which identifies certain goods or services as those 
produced or provided by a specific person or enterprise” (World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), 2011). Trademarks are most commonly filed in the form of a logo, 
symbol, name or phrase, but they can also be filed as a specific color, sound, smell or a 
combination of these factors. Most importantly, a trademark should be distinctive, i.e., it 
should not confuse consumers by being too identical or similar to an already granted 
trademark (Economides, 1988; Mendonça et al., 2004). The primary motivation behind filing 
a trademark is the ability to distinguish a firm‟s products or services from the competition. 
Through a trademarked brand name, consumers are able to identify the products that are 
offered by a specific firm. This form of identification allows a firm to build consumer loyalty, 
with the potential to charge a higher price (Flikkema et al, 2012). Trademarks function as the 
legal basis on which brand value can be built, securing benefits from future marketing 
investments (Sandner & Block, 2011).  
Both patents and trademarks protect the elements that are relevant for an innovative 
start-up. A trademark is important for the commercialization and the diffusion of a start-up‟s 
innovation, and a patent protects a start-up‟s technological knowledge, reflecting the start-
up‟s willingness to protect its invention. Patents and trademarks can therefore be understood 
as complementary assets in the allocation of returns from an innovation (Teece, 1986). Along 
these lines, both patents and trademarks can be a signal of new product development 
(Mendonça et al., 2004). Further, with regard to their exclusion right, patents have been 
widely discussed as relevant protectors of competitive advantage, providing the immediate 
power to exclude competitors from the use of critical technological knowledge (e.g., 
 8 
 
Greenhalgh & Rogers, 2010). Similarly, trademarks can also serve as exclusion mechanisms, 
providing market power (Davies, 2009; Kong, & Seldon, 2004; Ramello, 2006; Ramello & 
Silva, 2006). A relevant difference, however, is that the market power that is embedded in 
trademarks has to be built through frequent consumer interactions over time, whereas the 
filing of a patent immediately excludes competitors from producing and offering a product in 
the first place. Another relevant difference between patents and trademarks pertains to their 
duration: patents offer temporary protection, usually for a period of twenty years. Trademarks 
can be renewed indefinitely, as long as a renewal fee is paid every ten years and under the 
condition that its holder has been actively using the trademark. Furthermore, patents and 
trademarks differ with regard to the related investments that they protect. Investments that 
lead to an invention are conducted before a patent‟s filing date. In contrast, branding and 
marketing investments that are protected by a trademark are generally conducted after a 
trademark‟s filing date (Sandner & Block, 2011).  
When explaining IP strategy, a start-up‟s type of activity should be an important 
explanatory factor. When a start-up‟s activities are more R&D-intensive, it will have a 
greater likelihood of filing for a patent (Griliches, 1984; 1998; Kortum, 1993), whereas a 
start-up that is more consumer-oriented and advertising-intensive is more likely to file for a 
trademark (Malmberg, 2005; Mendonça et al., 2004). The following section develops 
hypotheses that consider additional explanatory factors that may drive the type of IP 
applications that are filed.  
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Market competition and IP strategy 
We argue that the intensity of competition within a market may affect an entering start-up‟s 
IP strategy. We distinguish between a trademark- and patent-oriented IP strategy.  
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We suggest that a start-up is more likely to adopt a trademark-oriented strategy when 
entering a more competitive market. Because it supports the connection between firms and 
consumers, the filing of a trademark should become more relevant when consumers have 
several similar firms to choose from in their purchasing decisions. When there are more 
competing firms, a start-up‟s visibility in the market becomes more relevant due to the 
increased need to persuade consumers to purchase its product. A trademark is primarily a tool 
that is used to establish a link of communication between a firm and consumers (Economides, 
1988; Flikkema et al., 2010). A second argument relates to the finding that more competitive 
markets are likely to have lower entry barriers in place (Caves & Porter, 1977; McAfee, 
Mialon, & Williams, 2004). Within a market that lacks powerful exclusion mechanisms, it is 
easy for new start-ups to become operational. It has been shown that competition can occur at 
the level of branding and competitive advantage can become embedded into trademarks, 
especially in markets that lack a strong entry barrier such as a patented technology (Davies, 
2009; Onkvisit & Shaw, 1989; Ramello & Silva, 2006; Schmalensee, 1978). Trademarks 
introduce differentiation into a market, as consumers can perceive one brand as being 
superior to another (DeYong & Örs, 2004; Ramello, 2006). In competitive markets, start-ups 
tend to rely more heavily on trademarks as a basic branding instrument to create a 
competitive advantage (Abimbola, 2001). Because a start-up‟s resources are limited, it 
focuses first on the designing of logos, symbols, and a suitable brand name, which are 
protected by trademarks. At this stage, few funds are available for more advanced tools such 
as advertising. Overall, the above discussion suggests that start-ups entering more 
competitive markets are likely to have a trademark-oriented IP strategy.  
In contrast, we suggest that a patent strategy becomes more crucial for start-ups when 
the level of market competition is lower. Under weak competition, entry barriers are likely to 
be in place, allocating market power to incumbent firms. Explanations for more concentrated 
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markets include the presence of economies of scale, limited market size, or superior access to 
inputs (Besanko, Dranove, Shanley, & Schaefer, 2010). When entering a more concentrated 
market, a patent will exclude incumbent firms from the use of a start-up‟s technological 
knowledge. A patent also suggests that a start-up‟s invention is novel, non-obvious, and 
useful (WIPO, 2004). This suggests that patents can play a critical role for start-ups that 
attempt to capture some initial market share. Prior studies indicate that start-ups that enter the 
market with protected novel technical knowledge are likely to pose a greater threat to 
established, powerful incumbents (Abernathy & Clark, 1984; Christensen & Bower, 1996; 
Henderson, 1993; Hill & Rothaermel, 2003). On the contrary, a trademark does not directly 
exclude competitors from a new technology. In this case, the only requirement is that 
competitors should do business under a different, unique brand name than the start-up, and 
thus they will not mislead consumers (Mendonça et al., 2004). Overall, without the strong 
protection of the core qualities of a start-up, it becomes more difficult to pose a threat to the 
incumbent firms that are in control of the resources within an industry. The above discussion 
suggests that start-ups that enter into less competitive industries are more likely to have 
patent-oriented IP strategies. We propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1. As market competition increases, start-ups are more likely to file an initial 
IP right in the form of a trademark rather than a patent.  
 
Customer type and IP strategy 
IP strategy may also be explained by a start-up‟s type of customer and its relative position 
within the supply chain. We distinguish between start-ups that operate downstream in the 
supply chain, serving end-consumers, and start-ups that operate more upstream in the supply 
chain, serving other businesses (Harland, 1996; Beamon, 1998). Whereas product 
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development is generally conducted upstream, it seems likely that start-ups that sell to other 
businesses provide relevant inputs to the product development process. In contrast, start-ups 
that sell to end-consumers should already own a marketable product, and thus they have a 
greater need to focus on distribution and marketing (Tan, 2001). 
Product development and marketing as core types of activity are recognized as strategic 
typologies in the start-up strategy literature. Porter‟s (1980) differentiation typology 
distinguishes between technical or product differentiation strategy, on the one hand, and 
marketing differentiation strategy, on the other (Carter et al., 1994; Chaganti et al., 1989; Li, 
2001; McGee et al., 1995; Miller, 1991; Schrader and Siegel, 2007). Under a product 
differentiation strategy, a start-up aims to achieve differentiation through R&D activities, 
creating a competitive advantage through product innovation (McGee et al, 1995), which is 
an upstream activity. In the case of a marketing differentiation strategy, a start-up specializes 
in marketing activities such as branding, promotion, design, service, image, and distribution, 
which are more downstream activities. Furthermore, start-ups are highly unlikely to come up 
with a new product (Carter et al., 1994; Miller, 1986). Accordingly, we expect that start-ups 
that engage in downstream activities and serve end-consumers are more likely to work under 
a marketing-oriented strategy, and they will therefore be in need of trademark protection. 
Start-ups that supply to other businesses are more likely to be involved in product 
development, and they should therefore benefit more from patent protection. We thus 
formulate the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2. Compared to start-ups that sell to other businesses, start-ups that sell to 
end-consumers are more likely to file an initial IP right in the form of a trademark 




The impact of VC funding on IP strategy 
The external influences on a start-up‟s management may also affect IP orientation. VCs are 
active investors who not only provide funding but also spend most of their time advising and 
monitoring the management of the start-ups in which they invest. VCs often sit on boards of 
directors and have powerful rights, such as, for example, the ability to fire the members of a 
start-up‟s management team (Gompers & Lerner, 2004; Sahlman, 1990). We argue that the 
involvement of a VC is likely to shift a start-up‟s focus toward the commercialization of its 
inventions. The extant literature shows that VCs find early-stage start-ups to be overly 
focused on the development of their inventions. VCs are of the opinion that start-ups should 
be more consumer-oriented and conduct market analysis (Hills, 1984; Hills, Hultman, & 
Miles, 2008; Hisrisch, 1989; Wortman, Spann, & Adams, 1989). When deciding to invest, a 
VC sets milestones that a start-up needs to achieve to receive subsequent funding rounds. In 
the early stages, such milestones are likely to be directed toward market orientation, making 
the product more consumer-friendly and localizing initial consumers who are willing to buy 
the product (Berkery, 2008). Accordingly, the involvement of a VC investor is likely to 
shorten a start-up‟s time-to-market and speed up the professionalization of marketing 
activities as compared to non-VC funded start-ups (Hellman & Puri, 2000; 2002). VCs have a 
limited time period in which to turn a start-up into a functioning company that can either 
conduct an IPO or be sold to an industrial firm. The VC seeks to bring a product to market as 
early as possible. The filing of a trademark is likely to be one of the initial steps that is taken 
in the commercialization process, securing the start-up‟s brand name and protecting its future 
marketing efforts (Sandner & Block, 2011). Hence, we derive the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 3. VC-backed start-ups are more likely to file an initial IP right in the 




DATA AND VARIABLES 
Data sources 
We analyzed the influence of market competition, a start-up‟s customer type, and the 
engagement of VC investors on a start-up‟s type of initial IP application, distinguishing 
between trademarks and patents. We used several data sources but restricted our data 
searches to the Unites States. VC-funded start-ups were taken from Thomson Reuters‟ 
VentureXpert database. Using the six-digit NAICS industry classification codes that are 
available from VentureXpert, we merged R&D- and advertising intensity measures calculated 
from COMPUSTAT and competition intensity data accessed through the US Census Bureau. 
Next, patent and trademark filing records were manually matched to the start-up‟s name and 
former aliases reported in VentureXpert.  
 
Sample and NAICS data 
We selected the US-based start-ups that received VC funds in the period from 1998 to 2007 
from VentureXpert, which resulted in a sample of 11,808 start-ups. We focused on start-ups 
with a valid reported NAICS classification, their foundation dates, and the amounts of VC 
funds that they received. We were unable to take into account data beyond 2007 because of 
the lengthy process surrounding patent applications and the successive granting of 
international patent protection. Patent filings are kept secret for 18 months, after which it may 
take several more years to secure international protection (Greenhalgh & Rogers, 2010).  
We define the market niche in which a start-up operates by the six-digit NAICS code 
that is available from VentureXpert. For each NAICS classification, we used the 
COMPUSTAT database to calculate the three-year averages of R&D and advertising 
intensity over our sample period (1998-2007). COMPUSTAT data is commonly used in 
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existing studies to calculate such measures (e.g., Chauvin & Hirschey, 1993; Waring, 1996). 
We were able to determine the R&D and advertising intensity measures for the market niches 
of 11,582 start-ups. Next, we obtained the competition intensity data that is published by the 
US Census Bureau every five years. The competition data that is provided by the US Census 
bureau is reliable, as each firm in the US is required by law to respond to the US Census 
survey (see Ali, Klasa, & Yeung, 2009, for a review).
2
 The competition intensity data was 
available for the market niches of 9,678 start-ups. Finally, we gathered US trademark and 
patent data for this sample.  
 
Trademark and patent data 
The IP searches were done through a manual process. The trademark applications were 
obtained from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) (see also Graham, 
Hancock, Marco, Myers; 2013). The US Patent applications were accessed through the 
PATSTAT database. The extent of the IP activities could be determined for 8,247 of the 
remaining start-ups (85.2%). A start-up was excluded when its name or one of its former 
aliases did not give a unique search result. Imperfect matches were verified through the 
industry and location records that are available from VentureXpert. We selected the start-ups 
that filed a first IP application in the period from 1998 to 2007, leading to a final sample of 
4,703 start-ups, which are active in 333 separate NAICS classes.  
 
Variables 
Our dependent variable was the binary variable trademark or patent, indicating whether a 
start-up filed its first IP application in the form of a trademark (=1) or a patent (=0). We used 
                                                 
2
 The US Census concentration measures are also used by the Federal Trade Commission when making 
decisions on anti-trust cases. 
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the application dates because they relate to the point in time at which the start-up made the 
strategic decision to obtain a specific type of IP. The publication date is less suitable to 
determine this point in time because the length of the application procedure may vary from 
case to case and is generally more complicated and lengthy for patents (WIPO, 2011). 
Because our dependent variable was binary, we used logistic regression models. As our main 
independent variables, we measured competition intensity using the C4 ratio, which is the 
sum of the market share of the four largest firms that are active within a particular NAICS 
class.
3
 The C4 ratio is widely accepted as a measure of competition intensity (e.g., 
Domowitz, Hubbard, & Peterson, 1986; Harris, 1998). Because, as noted above, competition 
data is published every five years by the US Census Bureau, we used the C4 ratio that was 
published in 1997 for the start-ups in our sample that had applied for an initial IP up until 
2002. We used the C4 ratio that was published in 2002 for the start-ups that filed an initial IP 
up until 2007. Further, we measured the effect of a VC investor on a start-up‟s IP strategy 
with the VC dummy variable, indicating whether the start-up received any VC funds up until 
the date of its first IP application. A start-up‟s customer type was captured by the Business-
to-consumer dummy, which indicates whether the start-up serves consumers (=1) or other 
businesses (=0). The information on a start-up‟s customer type is reported by VentureXpert at 
the date at which the start-up received VC funding. Of the 1,895 VC-backed start-ups in our 
sample, 1,438 start-ups were defined as serving either consumers or other businesses. Our 
hypothesis addressing the relationship between a start-up‟s customer type and its initial IP 
application will therefore be analyzed through this subsample. To capture the other factors 
                                                 
3
 The Herfindahl index was also available from the US Census Bureau, but it is only published for the 
manufacturing sectors. We used the four-firm-ratio because it was available for a broader range of industries. 
The correlation between the Herfindahl index and the four-firm-ratio was 0.93. Also, previous works suggest 
that there are no substantial differences between the two measures (e.g., Scott, 1993).  
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that may influence the initial IP application of a start-up, we used the following control 
variables. 
We control for the average R&D intensity and the average advertising intensity, which is 
calculated for each individual market niche in COMPUSTAT. We calculated the average 
R&D and advertising intensity within the market niche over the three years prior to a start-
up‟s initial IP application. Start-ups that operate in research-intensive market niches are more 
likely to file patent applications (Griliches, 1984; 1998). Similarly, a higher advertising 
intensity within a market niche may be related to a more trademark-oriented IP strategy 
(Malmberg, 2005; Mendonça et al., 2004).  
Further, we calculated start-up age in years at the date of a start-up‟s first IP application. 
To control for time trends in trademark or patent applications, we use ten application year 
dummies indicating the year in which the start-up applied for its first IP. Time-related shifts 
in environmental, management, or legal conditions may affect IP applications (Kortum & 
Lerner, 1999). We distinguished six industry dummies, categorized by VentureXpert, which 
are “biotechnology,” “communications and media,” “computer related,” “medical/health/life 
science,” “non-high-technology,” and “semiconductors/other electronics,” as IP protection 
regimes may vary across different industry types (Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009). Lastly, 
possible regional influences are controlled for by seventeen US region dummies, as the type 
and degree of regional technology orientation (e.g., Silicon Valley, New England) may affect 




Table 1 shows descriptive statistics across industries. As can be expected, patents are more 
likely to be filed as a first IP right within technology-based industries such as the biotech, 
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semiconductor, and medical/life science industries. Having a trademark as a first IP right is 
more likely in non-high-tech-, communications-, and computer-related industries.
4
 
Concerning a start-up‟s customer type, we found that start-ups are most likely to sell to 
consumers in the medical and life science industry (37.8%) and in the non-high-tech industry 
(35.1%). Start-ups supply to other businesses most frequently in the semiconductor industry 
(98.4%). This percentage seems to be in line with the suggestion that start-ups that serve 
other businesses are more likely to operate under a technical or product differentiation 
strategy. Further, the average R&D intensity (NAICS-based) is highest for markets that are 
related to biotech (44.2% of sales on average), whereas advertising intensity is highest in the 
computer-related and semiconductor industries (1.6% of sales on average). Lastly, the C4 
ratio reveals that competition is least intensive in the more technical, patent-driven markets 
such as semiconductors (C4 of 50.2%) and biotech (C4 of 41.3%). This finding is in line with 
previous studies that underscore the role of patents as powerful exclusion rights (Besanko et 
al., 2010; Greenhalgh & Rogers, 2010).  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for our full sample. Of the start-ups in our 
sample, 61% filed for a trademark first instead of a patent. This preference can be explained 
by the slightly broader applicability of trademarks, which is potentially relevant for both the 
technology- and service-related markets, whereas patents are especially relevant in 
technology-based markets (Greenhalgh & Rogers, 2006a). Further, we found that different 
types of competition intensity are represented in our sample. The average C4 ratio of the 
market niches that were entered is 36.4% (median 34.9%). Interestingly, the most competitive 
market niche is dental services, with a C4 ratio of 0.7% (NAICS classification = 621210). In 
contrast, the least competitive market niche is the manufacturing of space vehicles, with a C4 
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ratio of 91.6% (NAICS classification = 336414). With regard to VC financing, we observed 
that 40% of the start-ups in our sample had received VC funding before applying for their 
first IP right. Further, the market niches show on average a higher R&D (14.2% of sales) than 
advertising intensity (1.4% of sales). Both measures are right-skewed (e.g., maximum R&D 
intensity = 2,456.7%, mean = 14.2%). In the additional analysis section, we correct for this by 
taking only those NAICS sectors into account for which we have R&D and advertising 
intensity information for at least five firms (which resulted in a mean R&D intensity of 11.5% 
and a maximum value of 38.9%). Lastly, the average start-up‟s age when applying for a first 
IP right was 2.3 years. We use the logarithm of start-up age in our regression analysis.  
Table 3 shows the correlations and variance inflation factors (VIFs). The reported 
correlations are in line with our hypothesized effects. The VIFs in our regression models are 
well below the critical level of ten, indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem in our 
models (see also Neter, Wasserman & Kutner, 1985; Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & 
Tatham, 2006).  
 
--------------------------------------------- 




Table 4 shows the logistic regression results for our dependent variable trademark or patent. 
Model 1 only includes our control variables, but it still excludes the industry dummy 
variables. Interestingly, log (start-up age) shows that relatively newer start-ups are more 
likely to file for patents first. This seems intuitive, as R&D and product development 
activities tend to take place at an earlier stage than marketing, which involves the 
commercialization of an already sellable product. This effect is also in line with existing 
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studies, which show that start-ups tend to be overly focused on their inventions rather than on 
market orientation during the early stages (Hisrisch, 1989; Wortman et al., 1989). In the 
subsequent models, we test our hypothesized effects. Model 2 includes the C4 ratio, which is 
close to being significant at the 5% level, with a p-value of 0.053 (two-sided test). Its 
coefficient indicates that an increase in competition is likely to lead to a higher likelihood of 
filing the first IP right in the form of a trademark rather than a patent. More specifically, a 
decrease in the C4 ratio of 1% is likely to lead to a 1.2% increase in the likelihood of filing a 
trademark first. Further, Model 2 shows a negative and significant coefficient for R&D 
intensity, indicating a positive effect of this variable on filing for a patent. The effect of 
advertising intensity is positively significant at the 10% significance level, indicating a 
positive effect of this variable on filing for a trademark. In Model 3, we introduce the VC 
dummy variable, of which the coefficient shows that VC-backed start-ups are more likely to 
file their first IP right in the form of a trademark rather than a patent (p<0.01). This provides 
support for our third hypothesis. Next, Model 4 includes both the VC dummy and the C4 
ratio, revealing that the C4 ratio is significant at the 5% significance level while also 
controlling for the influence of VC investors on start-up management. This provides support 
for our first hypothesis. Finally, Model 5 checks the robustness of our results when 
introducing the industry dummy variables. Because the industry dummies capture variance in 
competition, the coefficient of the C4 ratio decreases and becomes significant at the 10% 
level. The VC dummy variable remains highly significant.  
Table 5 presents results with regard to a start-up‟s customer type (Hypothesis 2). We 
analyze the subsample of the 1,438 VC-backed start-ups for which we have customer type 
information. Model 1 is a baseline model that also includes the C4 ratio (p<0.01), which is 
again negative and significant. Model 2 includes the Business to consumer dummy. Its 
positive coefficient indicates that start-ups that sell to consumers are more likely to file an 
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initial IP right in the form of a trademark, whereas start-ups that sell to other businesses are 
more likely to file an initial IP right in the form of a patent. When including the industry 
dummy variables in Model 3, the business to consumer dummy remains significant (p<0.05). 
The C4 ratio, which is constructed on a sector level, is no longer significant when including 
the industry dummies. This finding is likely to be related to the lowered statistical power that 
is the result of focusing on the VC-backed subsample.  
 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Tables 4 and 5 here 
------------------------------------------ 
 
Additional analyses and robustness checks 
We conducted several additional analyses. A first robustness check is related to the R&D and 
advertising intensity measures, which are right-skewed. As noted, these measures are 
calculated for each NAICS class based on COMPUSTAT data. For some sectors, however, 
the COMPUSTAT data holds information for only a few individual firms. We corrected for 
this by using only the average R&D and advertising intensity measures that are based on 
sectors that hold at least five firms, thereby reducing the volatility of these measures. This 
reduction in volatility reduced our sample to 3,966 start-ups that are active in 216 different 
NAICS classifications. The regression results are presented in Table 6, showing a more 
intuitive coefficient for the R&D intensity (e.g., -0.001 in Model 1, Table 4 versus -0.029, in 
Model 1, Table 6). Table 6 shows similar results for our hypothesized effects.  
As a second robustness check, we excluded the start-ups in our sample for which the 
dates of the first patent and trademark applications were recorded within six months of each 
other. Given that these start-ups applied for both types of IP within a short period of time, 
there may be no clear preference for either a trademark or a patent. Further, by excluding 
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these start-ups, we reduced the possibility that our dependent variable is incorrect due to 
errors or delays in the recording of the application dates or due to the differences between the 
filing systems of patents and trademarks. This step reduced our sample to 3,891 start-ups that 
are active in 319 NAICS sectors. The results of our hypothesized effects remain similar to the 
results from our main analysis.
5
  
Thirdly, our results may be driven by the large number of start-ups that are active in the 
same NAICS class. Overall, our sample holds 4,703 start-ups that are active in 333 separate 
NAICS classes. Because the C4 ratio, R&D, and advertising intensity are measured per 
NAICS category, the variance in our sample becomes limited in cases where many start-ups 
are active within the same NAICS classes. The distribution of start-ups over NAICS classes 
is highly skewed (1,267 start-ups were active in the most prominent NAICS class, followed 
by 441 start-ups in the second most prominent NAICS class). We checked for the impact of 
the sector distribution by excluding the NAICS classes that held more than fifty start-ups. We 
found similar results with regard to our hypothesized effects. Shifting the cut-off point in 
terms of the number of start-ups per NAICS class further down, for example excluding 
NAICS classes with more than twenty-five start-ups, also led to similar results.  
Finally, the VentureXpert database, reporting VC investments, contains additional 
information on the start-ups in our sample, which may be relevant to control for. We 
conducted a subsample analysis, considering only the start-ups that received VC funds before 
applying for their first IP right.
6
 For these start-ups, we were able to control for more 
information that we gathered from the reported funding round in VentureXpert. VCs 
categorize a start-up as being in a specific stage, differentiating whether a start-up is still 
working on its first proto-type, or if it is already in a later stage, working on initial sales, 
                                                 
5
 The result of this robustness check and subsequent regressions are available upon request. 
6
 40 percent of the start-ups received VC funds before their first IP application. 
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expanding its market share, or, ultimately, looking for an exit. Furthermore, we were able to 
control for the funding stage (round number), the amount of VC funds received, the number 
of investors involved, the VCs‟ experience and maturity levels, and the different types of VC 
investors (VC firms, business angel, corporate investor, financial institution, governmental 
investors). Each specific VC actor type operates under a different set of incentives and may 
therefore influence the start-up‟s management in a different manner (Dushnitsky & Shapira, 
2010; Sorenson & Stuart, 2008). Controlling for these additional factors, we find similar 
effects for the C4 ratio (ß = –0.015, p<0.01) and the Business to consumer dummy (ß = 0.649, 
p<0.01). 
----------------------------------------- 




Our study is the first to analyze the determinants of IP orientation by distinguishing between 
patent and trademarks applications. We examine the initial IP direction (a trademark or a 
patent) of 4,743 start-up entrants in the US between 1998 and 2007. Our findings contribute 
to several literature streams. 
Firstly, we extend the literature on market structure and IP rights. Previous studies have 
focused mainly on the relations between market structure and patenting (e.g., Arora, 1997; 
Acs & Audretsch, 1987; Greenhalgh & Rogers, 2006a; Levin et al., 1985; Loury, 1979; 
Malerba & Orsenigo, 2002; Scherer, 1984), and, more recently, also considered the role of 
trademarks (Davies, 2009; Kong, & Seldon, 2004; Ramello, 2006; Ramello & Silva, 2006). 
We contribute to this literature by addressing trademarks and patents jointly, considering the 
effect of market structure on the IP strategy of entering start-ups. We show that entering start-
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ups are more trademark-oriented in competitive markets and become more patent-oriented as 
market competition decreases.  
Previous studies that address the relationship between patents and market structure 
suggest that market power provides an increased incentive to invest in R&D, which leads to 
increased patenting (Schumpeterian view). Moreover, in a similar vein, patents are suggested 
to be one of the main determinants of market structure (Arora, 1997; see also Cohen & Levin 
(1989) who discuss empirical studies on both relationships). With regard to these prior 
findings, we argue that reverse causality should not be an issue in our analysis. We consider 
the initial patent and trademark applications of new entering start-ups. These IP applications 
are unlikely to have affected the given C4 ratio, which is measured prior to the application 
dates. Further, the controls that have been included regarding industry types and the average 
R&D intensity within the specific market niche should reduce the likelihood that the effect 
that was found for the C4 ratio is determined by patenting.  
Secondly, we contribute by providing empirical evidence for the intuition that the 
protection of brand and advertising assets by trademarks is more relevant for start-ups that 
operate downstream and distribute products to end-consumers (Carter et al., 1994; Miller, 
1986; Tan, 2001). Correspondingly, we show that patents, protecting inputs in the production 
process, are more likely to be used upstream when a start-up sells to other businesses 
(Lambert, 2008; McGee et al, 1995).  
Thirdly, our findings contribute to the literature on the role of IP rights in venture capital 
financing by showing that VC-backed start-ups are more likely to file an initial IP right in the 
form of a trademark rather than a patent, as compared with start-ups that are not yet under the 
care of a VC. Previous works in this area show that VC investors positively value patents, 
and they also suggest that patented start-ups should be able to attract VC funds more easily 
than other start-ups (Audretsch, Bönte, & Mahagaonkar, 2012; Cao & Hsu, 2011; Engel & 
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Keilbach, 2007; Haeussler et al., 2009; Baum & Silverman, 2004; Hsu & Ziedonis, 2007; 
Lerner, 1994; Mann & Sager, 2007). The work of Block et al. (2012) is the first to address 
trademark valuations by VCs, and they showed that trademarks are valued positively in a 
start-up‟s early stages. Our study extends this literature by showing that VCs also affect the 
type of IP that is filed by the start-ups in which they invest. The preference of VCs for filing 
trademarks is understandable when we consider the timeline that a VC has to relate to 
(generally five to ten years to exit a start-up) and thus the need for start-ups to become 
operational on the market (see also Hellman & Puri, 2000). The results also contribute to the 
literature by addressing the impact of VC financing on the development of start-up firms. 
Previous studies have shown that VCs are likely to affect the financial performance of the 
start-up in which they invested (Schefczyk & Gerpott, 2001; Fitza, Matusik, & Mosakowski, 
2009), the start-up‟s professionalization (Hellman & Puri, 2002), the start-up‟s time-to-
market (Hellman & Puri, 2000), the start-up‟s growth rate (Davila, Foster, & Gupta, 2003), 
and the start-up‟s probability of surviving (Manigart, Baeyens, & Van Hyfte, 2002). Our 
findings add that VCs are likely to influence the IP management of start-ups, increasing the 
likelihood of filing an initial IP in the form of a trademark rather than a patent.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Although we provide novel contributions, our paper contains a number of limitations that 
lead to several suggestions for future research. First, our analysis only considers the very first 
IP applications that are filed by start-up firms. Though early-stage entrants have the 
advantage of not being likely to influence market structure (as measured by the C4 
concentration index), we have to be careful in drawing conclusions regarding the IP strategies 
of later-stage, more mature companies. Future research could analyze the interactions of IP 
strategies and market structure over time, taking into account the causality issues that are 
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discussed in the patent-market structure literature (Cohen & Levin, 1989). Second, our 
dataset, which contains information on market dynamics and start-up firm-level 
characteristics, had to be constructed from several data sources. With regard to the IP data, 
the matching process relied on the manual creation of company name patterns that were used 
to extract information on trademark and patent filings. This method proved to be highly 
reliable, and it was individually checked against the records in the USPTO trademark 
register. Still, we cannot completely rule out possible mismatches or the failure to include 
relevant IP applications in our dataset (IP data can be identified for 85.3% of the start-ups 
that were taken from VentureXpert). Third, we have only limited information with regard to 
the background of the entrepreneurs that were involved in the start-ups. Such information 
could be relevant; for example, venture founding teams with more technical backgrounds 
might be more focused on patenting in early stages, whereas founders with more previous 
experience in the marketing field may be more likely to recognize the relevance of 
trademarks (see also Munari & Toschi, 2010; Wright, Lockett, Clarysse, & Binks, 2006). As 
our work solely employs publicly available data sources, survey-based data could help us 
understand IP decisions more thoroughly at the firm level. 
As we expect that trademarks play a relevant, potentially powerful role in the 
protection of innovative assets, especially in combination with patents, we encourage future 
work to help us understand IP strategies at a portfolio level and in later company stages.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Analyzing the initial trademark and patent applications of 4,703 start-up entrants, we find that 
market structure, a start-up‟s customer type, and the involvement of a VC investor have a 
significant influence on a start-up‟s initial IP direction. Our findings show that as market 
competition intensifies, entering start-ups will be more likely to file initial IPs in the form of 
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a trademark and less likely to file an initial IP in the form of a patent. Our results further 
show that trademarks are a greater priority for start-ups that serve end-consumers, as 
compared with patents, which are more likely to be filed by start-ups that operate more 
upstream when selling to other businesses. Lastly, we find that the ambition of VC investors 
to bring a start-up‟s product to market leads to a greater likelihood of filing an initial IP right 
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TABLES TO BE INSERTED IN THE TEXT 
 
TABLE 1 
Descriptive statistics: Industry categories 
Industry category 
% of start-ups 
in sample 
% start-ups filing a 
trademark first or a 
patent first 
Start-ups‟ 







intensity (in %) 
Average 
C4 ratio 
Biotechnology 6.5 trademark: 35.2 Consumer: 27.2 44.2 1.0 41.3 
  patent: 64.8 Business: 72.8    
Communications and media 14.1 trademark: 61.2 Consumer: 7.3 11.0 1.3 37.8 
  patent: 38.8 Business: 92.7    
Computer-related 47.9 trademark: 72.4 Consumer: 14.3 12.5 1.6 34.6 
  patent: 27.6 Business: 85.7    
Medical/life science 11.6 trademark: 39.4 Consumer: 37.8 10.0 1.0 33.5 
  patent: 60.6 Business: 62.2    
Non high-tech 10.4 trademark: 73.5 Consumer: 35.1 14.4 1.3 30.4 
  patent: 26.5 Business: 64.9    
Semiconductor/other elect. 9.5 trademark: 30.9 Consumer: 1.6 12.2 1.6 50.2 
  patent: 69.1 Business: 98.4    
 
Notes: N = 4,703 start-ups (customer type is based on 1,438 start-ups). Data sources: VC data from VentureXpert (accessed 
October 28, 2011); trademark data from United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO); patent data from PATSTAT 
Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (OECD/European Patent Office); R&D and advertising intensity from COMPUSTAT; C4 








Variables Mean S.D. Median Min. Max. Skewness 
Trademark (=1) or patent (=0) 0.61  1 0 1  
C4 ratio 36.4 18.0 34.9 0.7 91.6 0.3 
VC dummy 0.40  0 0 1  
Business to consumer dummy 0.17  0 0 1  
R&D intensity 14.2 73.0 11.7 0 2,456.7 25.3 
Advertising intensity 1.4 1.7 1.2 0 32.4 4.6 
Start-up age (in years) 2.3 4.8 1.0 0 86.1 6.8 
 
Notes: N = 4,703 start-ups (Business to consumer dummy regards 1,438 start-ups). Data sources: VC data from VentureXpert 
(accessed October 28, 2011); trademark data from United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO); patent data from 
PATSTAT Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (OECD/European Patent Office); R&D and advertising intensity from 






 TABLE 3 
Correlations 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 VIFs a 
1. Trademark or patent              
2. C4 ratio -0.094*            1.14 
3. VC dummy 0.133* 0.024           1.20 
4. Business to consumer dummy 0.049* -0.104* -0.072*          1.17 
5. R&D intensity -0.031 0.007 -0.016 0.009         1.02 
6. Advertising intensity 0.051* 0.188* 0.027 0.058* -0.014        1.09 
7.  Log (Start-up age) 0.179* -0.034 0.354* -0.042 -0.009 -0.012       1.24 
8. Industry: biotechnology -0.138* 0.072* -0.040* 0.062* 0.108* -0.061* -0.065*      1.45 
9. Industry: communic. and media 0.004 0.032 0.052* -0.105* -0.018 -0.019 -0.031 -0.107*      
10. Industry: computer-related 0.229* -0.100* 0.051* -0.073* -0.022 0.100* 0.060* -0.252* -0.389*    2.34 
11. Industry: medical/life science -0.159* -0.059* -0.064* 0.183* -0.021 -0.093* -0.049* -0.095* -0.147* -0.348*   1.71 
12. Industry: non high-tech 0.089* -0.114 -0.030 0.162* 0.001 -0.031 0.118* -0.090* -0.138* -0.327* -0.124*  1.66 
13. Industry: semicond/other elect. -0.198* 0.248* -0.014 -0.142* -0.009 0.037 -0.073* -0.085* -0.131* -0.311* -0.117* -0.110* 1.59 
 
Notes: N = 4,703 start-ups (Business to consumer dummy regards 1,438 start-ups). Data sources: VC data from VentureXpert (accessed October 28, 2011); trademark data from 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO); patent data from PATSTAT Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (OECD/European Patent Office); R&D and advertising 
intensity from COMPUSTAT; C4 ratio from US Census Bureau. Sample includes start-ups that filed first IP during the period 1998-2007. 
* Significance level p ≤ 0.01  





TABLE 4  
The effect of market structure and VC funding on a start-up’s initial IP 
(Hypothesis 1 and 3) 
 
Dependent variable: Trademark(=1) or patent(=0) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent variables      
      
C4 ratio  -0.012†  -0.012* -0.005† 
  (0.006)  (0.006) (0.003) 










 R&D intensity  -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 









   (0.063) (0.070) (0.062) (0.070) (0.026) 









  (0.048) (0.049) (0.043) (0.045) (0.049) 
      
IP applic. year dummies (10 cat.) p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 
      
US region dummies (17 cat.) p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 
      
Industry: biotechnology     -0.982** 
      (0.159) 
 Industry: computer-related     0.481** 
      (0.130) 
 Industry: medical/life science     -0.887** 
      (0.214) 
 Industry: non high-tech     0.439** 
      (0.160) 
 Industry: semiconductors/other elect.     -1.110** 
      (0.174) 
 
      
N start-ups 4,703 4,703 4,703 4,703 4,703 
N NAICS sectors (6-digit) 333 333 333 333 333 
Chi-squared (model fit) 486.59** 489.60** 520.49** 527.66** 1,433.41** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.055 
 
0.062 0.060 0.067 0.125 
Increases in model fit (LR-test) a  44.22** 30.33** 46.98** 365.83** 
 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered on 6-digit NAICS sectors (in parentheses). Reference group for IP application year: 2001; reference US region: 
„Silicon Valley‟; reference industry: „communications and media‟. Data sources: VC data from VentureXpert (accessed October 28, 2011); 
trademark data from United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO); patent data from PATSTAT Worldwide Patent Statistical Database 
(OECD/European Patent Office); R&D and advertising intensity from COMPUSTAT; C4 ratio from US Census Bureau. Sample includes start-ups 
that filed first IP during the period 1998-2007.  
a Likelihood ratio tests relate to the preceding nested model.  
† Significance level p < 0.1. 
* Significance level 0.05 > p ≥ 0.01.  
** Significance level p ≤ 0.01. 





Subsample analysis: The effect of customer type on a start-up’s 
initial IP (Hypothesis 2) 
 
Dependent variable: Trademark(=1) or patent(=0) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Independent variables    
    
C4 ratio -0.015** -0.014* -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) 
Business to consumer dummy   0.579* 0.608* 
  (0.247) (0.251) 
R&D intensity  -0.001* -0.001** -0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 





   (0.089) (0.093) (0.059) 





  (0.078) (0.076) (0.075) 
    
IP applic. year dummies (10 cat.) p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 
    
US region dummies (17 cat.) p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 
    
Industry: biotechnology   -1.068* 
    (0.522) 
 Industry: computer-related   0.568** 
    (0.189) 
 Industry: medical/life science   -0.486 
    (0.334) 
 Industry: non high-tech   0.576 
    (0.328) 
 Industry: semiconductors/other elect.   -1.203** 
    (0.294) 
 
    
N start-ups 1,438 1,438 1,438 
N NAICS sectors (6-digit) 174 174 174 
Chi-squared (model fit) 269.06 275.11** 559.29** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.069 0.074 0.129 
Increases in model fit (LR-test) a  9.00** 96.29** 
 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered on 6-digit NAICS sectors (in parentheses). Reference group for IP application year: 2001; reference US region: 
„Silicon Valley‟; reference industry: „communications and media‟. Data sources: VC data from VentureXpert (accessed October 28, 2011); 
trademark data from United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO); patent data from PATSTAT Worldwide Patent Statistical Database 
(OECD/European Patent Office); R&D and advertising intensity from COMPUSTAT; C4 ratio from US Census Bureau. Sample includes start-ups 
that filed first IP during the period 1998-2007.  
a Likelihood ratio tests relate to the preceding nested model.  
† Significance level p < 0.1. 
* Significance level 0.05 > p ≥ 0.01.  
** Significance level p ≤ 0.01. 












Trademark(=1) or patent(=0) 
Subsample: start-ups with 
customer type information 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent variables      
      
C4 ratio  -0.018** -0.006† -0.020** -0.005 
  (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) 










Business to consumer dummy    0.547* 
 
0.596* 
     (0.264) 
 
(0.275) 
 R&D intensity  -0.029* -0.017 -0.019* -0.010 -0.008 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) 









  (0.096) (0.092) (0.032) (0.114) (0.075) 









  (0.054) (0.055) (0.056) (0.088) (0.086) 
      
IP applic. year dummies (10 cat.) p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 
      
US region dummies (17 cat.) p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 
      
Industry: biotechnology   -0.712** 
 
 -0.860 
    (0.172) 
 
 (0.566) 
 Industry: computer-related   0.540** 
 
 0.650** 
    (0.126) 
 
 (0.201) 
 Industry: medical/life science   -0.863** 
 
 -0.374 
    (0.204) 
 
 (0.336) 
 Industry: non high-tech   0.409* 
 
 0.760†  
    (0.180) 
 
 (0.388) 
 Industry: semiconductors/other elect.   -1.036** 
 
 -1.151** 




      
N start-ups 3,966 3,966 3,966 1,181 1,181 
N NAICS sectors (6-digit) 216 216 216 126 126 
Chi-squared (model fit) 396.04** 528.16** 1,593.79** 398.12** 751.94** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.064 0.079 0.132 0.077 0.132 
Increases in model fit (LR-test) a  81.38** 285.97**  81.30** 
 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered on 6-digit NAICS sectors (in parentheses). Reference group for IP application year: 2001; reference US region: 
„Silicon Valley‟; reference industry: „communications and media‟. Data sources: VC data from VentureXpert (accessed October 28, 2011); 
trademark data from United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO); patent data from PATSTAT Worldwide Patent Statistical Database 
(OECD/European Patent Office); R&D and advertising intensity from COMPUSTAT; C4 ratio from US Census Bureau. Sample includes start-ups 
that filed first IP during the period 1998-2007.  
a Likelihood ratio tests relate to the preceding nested model.  
† Significance level p < 0.1. 
* Significance level 0.05 > p ≥ 0.01.  
** Significance level p ≤ 0.01. 
Two-sided tests are used. 
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